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et al.: FRE and NY Evidence Comparison

RULE 803(18): LEARNED TREATISES
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(18) states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness:
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of
an expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by the
expert witness in direct examination, statements contained in
published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of
history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a
reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or
by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the
statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as
exhibits. 1
Federal Rule 803(18) provides a hearsay exception for
statements contained in learned treatises. The writings can be
used as substantive evidence if an expert witness, either on direct
or cross-examination, testifies to the authoritativeness of the
treatise. 2 The rule is based on the supposition that learned
treatises are of "a high standard of accuracy [which] is
engendered by various factors: the treatise is written primarily
and impartially for professionals, subject to scrutiny and
exposure for inaccuracy, with the reputation of the writer at
stake." 3 The rationale for admitting learned treatises as
substantive evidence is to aid the trier of fact's understanding of
the subject. 4 Hence, the trier of fact can benefit from the

1. FED. R. EviD. 803(18).

2. 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 803(18)[02], at 375 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 1995) ("Rule
803(18) admits only those treatises whose existence is disclosed while an
expert is on the stand, either by the expert on direct examination or by the
questioner in the course of cross-examination.").
3. FED. R. EviD. 803(18) advisory committee's note.
803(18)1021, at 379
4. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2,
("Since the object of this rule is to make valuable information available to the
trier of fact, trial judges should not destroy the exception by insisting on a
quantum of proof for establishing the treatise's authoritativeness that the
proponent cannot meet.").
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trustworthiness of a learned treatise in addition to the live
5
testimony of an expert witness.
The Rule provides that the proponent of evidence must
establish the work's reliability as an authority on the subject
before it is actually read to the fact finder. 6 This requirement
may be fulfilled two ways. First, an expert witness may testify as
to whether the treatise is an authority. 7 Second, the
authoritativeness of the treatise may be established by judicial
notice. 8 Once the statements from the treatise are established as
reliable and addressed on direct or cross examination, the jury
may consider them as substantive evidence. 9 Thus, Federal Rule

803(18) recognizes that an opportunity may exist for a fact finder
to misapply evidence without expert guidance. 10
Traditionally, material from learned treatises was only used to
impeach a witness, and thus, was not admissible as substantive
5. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 321, at 350 (John William Strong
ed., 4th ed. 1992) ("[A]dmitting the sources would greatly improve the quality
of information presented to trial courts in litigated cases.").
6. See Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d. 987, 991 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Failure,
therefore, to lay a foundation as to the authoritative nature of a treatise
requires its exclusion from evidence because the court has no basis on which to
view it as trustworthy.").
7. See MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 321, at 352. ("A significant
limitation is that the publication must be called to the attention of an expert on
cross-examination or relied upon by the expert in direct examination.").
8. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, 803(18)[02], at 379 ("[A]
court might take judicial notice of books admitted in the course of other
litigation."); see FED. R. EVID. 201. FED. R. EVID. 201 governs a court
taking judicial notice of adjudicative facts. Id. The kinds of facts a court may
take judicial notice of are those which are "not subject to reasonable dispute in
that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned." Id.
9. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, 803(18)[02], at 379-80
("The court will not ... instruct the jury to accept the treatise as authoritative,
but will leave its weight for the jury to determine based upon the evidence and
comments of counsel and the court.").
10. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2,
803(18)[02], at 375.
("Limiting the admission of treatises to situations when an expert is testifying
guarantees that the trier of fact will have the benefit of expert evaluation and
explanation of how the published material relates to the issues in the case.").
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evidence. 11 However, in Reilly v. Pinkus,12 the United States
Supreme Court held it was a prejudicial error not to permit cross-

examination of an expert witness, even though the crossexamination consisted of statements contained in books other than
those in which the experts based their testimony. 13 The Court
explained that "this was an undue restriction on the right to

cross-examine," since the expert witness relied on comparable
textbooks and publications. 14 Although the Court recognized that
learned treatises do not have the usual hearsay danger of
11. See Egan v. Dry Dock, E.B. & B.R.R. Co., 12 A.D. 556, 571, 42
N.Y.S. 188, 200 (1st Dep't 1896). Egan involved a personal injury action,
which was the result of a boiler exploding in which the defendant, a street
railroad company who was responsible for maintaining and inspecting such a
boiler "to see that ... [it] was in a reasonably safe condition." sought to
introduce evidence of an expert witness at trial. Id. at 557-59, 570. 42 N.Y.S.
at 189-90, 199. During the cross-examination, the expert witness was
presented with "certain books on the design, construction, and operation of
boilers." Id. at 570; 42 N.Y.S. at 199. One of the books was written by an
expert testifying on behalf of plaintiff and it described a test for inspecting
boilers which ran contrary to defendant's expert's beliefs and opinions on the
subject. Id. When asked about certain passages in the book, the defense
objected and the court overruled the objection finding that:
[I]f the witness admitted that text writers of acknowledged authority had
expressed opinions contrary to that one which he gave in regard to the
matter under examination, that might go to detract from the weight to be
given to such testimony. Therefore, it has been the custom, in this state
at least, to call the attention of expert witness, upon cross-examination.
to books upon the subject, and ask whether or not authors whom he
admitted to be good authority had not expressed opinions different from
that which was given by him upon the stand. The reference to books in
such cases is not made for the purpose of making the statements in the
books evidence before a jury, but solely for the purpose of ascertaining
the weight to be given to the testimony of the witness.
Id. at 571, 42 N.Y.S. 199-200.
12. 338 U.S. 269 (1949).
13. Id. at 275. The Court noted that "[i]t certainly is illogical, if not
actually unfair, to permit witnesses to give expert opinions based on book
knowledge, and then deprive the party challenging such evidence of all
opportunity to interrogate them about divergent opinions expressed in other
reputable books." Id.
14. Id.
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misapplication of evidence, the Court did not discuss whether the
15
fact finder in this case required expert guidance.

Following Federal Rule 803(18), the Second Circuit, in Tart v.
McGann,16 held that medical literature may be admitted as
substantive evidence if an expert witness testifies as to its

authoritativeness.

17

The court noted that the Advisory Committee

on the Federal Rules of Evidence relied on the inherent reliability

of such written works as the basis for an extension of the
common law approach. 18 Further, in Schneider v. Revici, 19 the
Second Circuit held that a book written by the defendant

physician

required

expert

testimony

as

to

the

book's

authoritativeness. 20 The court explained that "Rule 803(18)

explicitly requires that to qualify under the learned treatise
exception, a proper foundation as to the authoritativeness of the
text must be laid by an expert witness."

21

15. Id. at 275-76. The court discussed the purpose behind the use of
certain materials on the cross-examination of an expert witness without ever
addressing whether the fact finder would need expert guidance upon the
admissibility of such evidence. Id.
It is also contended that the error in restricting cross-examination was
harmless here because the memorandum of the fact-finding official
indicated that he had read the excluded materials and would have made
the same adverse findings had the materials been held admissible. But
the object of using the books on cross-examination was to test the
expert's testimony by having him refer to and comment upon their
contents. Respondent was deprived of this opportunity. The error of this
deprivation could not be cured by having the fact-finder subsequently
examine the material.
Id.
16. 697 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1982).
17. Id.at 78.
18. Id.See also FED. R. EVmD. 803(18) advisory committee's note.
19. 817 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1987).
20. Id.at 991.
21. Id.In this medical malpractice action, the defendant physician sought
to introduce into evidence a book which he authored on the topic of
physiopathology as a treatment for cancer. Id. at 990. The trial court
recognized that in order for the physician's book to be admitted into evidence
as a learned treatise, defense counsel must lay the appropriate foundation; to
wit:
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In contrast, New York courts have not been as liberal in the
admission of this type of evidence. In People v. Feldman22 the
New York Court of Appeals stated the New York rule as the
following:
In this State when an expert witness has given opinion testimony
and on cross-examination has testified that a book called to his
attention is recognized by him as an authority upon the subject as
to which he has given an opinion, he may be confronted with a
passage from the book which conflicts with the opinion he has
expressed. This is permitted for the purpose of discrediting or
23
weakening his testimony.

Hence, the Felnan decision is premised on the notion that
reference to treatises is "solely for the purpose of ascertaining the
weight to be given to the testimony of the witness" rather than
for offering the statements in the treatises as proof of the facts
asserted. 24

It is essential for an expert witness to acknowledge the
authoritativeness of the treatise. 2 5 For instance, in Florence v.
Get some expert to come in here and testif , that it is a recognized
treatise as the rule requires,... the proper question to the witness is

whether the book is recognized in the medical profession as an
authoritative book on the treatment of cancer.
Id. at 991 (citations omitted). Thus, the court of appeals found that the
"[f]ailure... to lay a foundation as to the authoritative nature of a treatise
requires its exclusion from evidence because the court has no basis on which to
view it as trustworthy." Id.
22. 299 N.Y. 153, 85 N.E.2d 913 (1949).
23. Id. at 168, 85 N.E.2d at 920 (emphasis added). See also Hastings v.
Chrysler Corp., 273 A.D. 292, 294, 77 N.Y.S.2d 524, 527 (ist Dep't 19481
("IT~he reference to [learned treatises) has no bearing on their truth or
validity; they are used only as tending to impeach the witness on the stand with
respect to his knowledge of the subject on which he professes to be an
expert.").
24. Feldman, 299 N.Y. at 168, 85 N.E.2d at 920. See also cases cited
supra footnote 11.
25. Hastings v. Chrysler Corp., 273 A.D. 292, 294. 77 N.Y.S.2d 524.
527 (1st Dep't 1948). ("If the expert witness does not concede the
authoritativeness of the literature attempted to be resorted to. it may not be
used on cross-examination."). See also Roveda v. Weiss, 11 A.D.2d 745. 74t.
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Goldberg,26 the court stated that "[i]t is well settled that, upon
cross-examination, counsel may seek to discredit an expert
witness by reference to texts or articles, but only insofar as they
are recognized by the expert as authoritative upon the subject as
to which he has expressed an opinion." 27 The court held that an
expert witness in the area of neurology properly rejected texts as
28
authoritative on the basis that they were outdated.
New York's interpretation concerning the use of learned
treatises is distinguishable from the federal approach. Federal
Rule 803(18) permits the use of such learned treatises both for
impeachment purposes and to assist the trier of fact in
understanding of the subject. In contrast, New York's use of
learned treatises may be used only to impeach expert testimony
on cross examination. However, both Federal Rule 803(18) and
New York's interpretation of the rule require the reliability of
authority to be established by expert testimony.

204 N.Y.S.2d 699, 701 (2d Dep't 1960) (reversing a decision of the Richmond
County Supreme Court which had permitted the use of texts not previously
accepted for their authoritativeness by the witnesses).
26. 48 A.D.2d 917, 369 N.Y.S.2d 794 (2d Dep't 1975).
27. Id. at 919-20, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 799 (citations omitted).
28. Id.
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